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I. Introduction
Friedrich  Nietzsche’s  philosophical  oeuvre  spanned  a  dozen  or  so  books  in  the 
relatively short period of 16 years. Distilling that diverse body of work is no easy task. 
Yet in an encyclopedic entry of the present sort, broad coverage needs to be of the essence. 
There are various potential approaches to oﬀering such an overview. One could organize a 
summary  topically,  outlining  Nietzsche’s  views  under  the  garden-variety  sub-headings  of 
philosophy (epistemology, ethics, mind, and the like).  Or one could proceed thematically, 
focusing  discussion  around  key  Nietzschean  themes—e.g.,  Judeo-Christian  morality,  life 
aﬃrmation,  asceticism,  the  will  to  truth,  and  the  will  to  power.  Or  one  could  proceed 
chronologically, going through the succession of Nietzsche’s main texts and highlighting a 
few key philosophical  ideas  from each.  There are  advantages  and disadvantages  to each 
approach. I will be opting (mostly) for the latter, chronological format.  I’ll begin with some 
brief biographical information and some general remarks about Nietzsche’s philosophical 
methodology  and  style.  Something  will  also  need  to  be  said  about  the  controversy 
surrounding his notebooks and what role they should play in the exegesis of his views. I will 
then turn to the discussion of his books themselves, beginning with The Birth of  Tragedy 
(1872)  and ending  with  his  autobiography Ecce  Homo  (1888).  I  conclude  by  reflecting  on 
Nietzsche’s philosophical and cultural legacy. 
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II. Biography
Nietzsche  was  born  in  1844  in  the  village  of  Röcken  in  Saxony.  His  father,  a 1
Lutheran pastor, died when Nietzsche was young. Nietzsche was sent to the academically 
rigorous school at Schulpforta where he excelled in some subjects and floundered in others. 
His university education began in Bonn, and continued in Leipzig, where he studied classical 
philology with one of the leading philological lights of the day, Friedrich Ritschl. Nietzsche’s 
early work was extremely promising, and with Ritschl’s glowing recommendation, Nietzsche 
secured a  professorship at  the University  of  Basel  at  the astoundingly  young age of  24. 
Nietzsche lectured for roughly a decade in Basel, but as the result of increasingly ill-health, 
he resigned his post and lived subsequently oﬀ his modest state pension.
Two  figures  exerted  a  considerable  influence  on  Nietzsche’s  early  philosophical 
development:  Arthur Schopenhauer and Richard Wagner.  The former Nietzsche did not 
know personally, but he encountered his ideas mainly through Schopenhauer’s magnum opus 
The World as Will and Representation. Though Schopenhauer casts a shadow over Nietzsche’s 
early works, Nietzsche came roundly to reject him, and by the time of Nietzsche’s mature 
work On the Genealogy of Morality, Schopenhauer had become one of his main philosophical 
targets. With Wagner, Nietzsche had a close personal relationship. In the time Nietzsche 
was at Basel,  Wagner was in exile nearby at Tribschen, and was at work on Der Ring des 
Niebelungen, a cycle of music dramas, which was to premiere in 1876. Following the premiere, 
 For general biographies of Nietzsche, see Cate (2002), Safranksi (2003), Young (2010). For most 1
focused treatments of diﬀerent periods of his life, see, Blue (2016), D’Iorio (2016), Chamberlain 
(1996). 
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Nietzsche and Wagner’s relationship cooled, and soon broke oﬀ, for reasons partly personal 
and partly philosophical.
From  the  late  1870s,  Nietzsche  spent  much  of  his  time  between  Italy  and 
Switzerland, living in boarding houses and occupied with writing and going for long, solitary 
walks. During this period, he produced an astonishing range of books. He spent the final 
lucid months of his life in Turin, where he had a great creative outpouring in 1888. But he 
began slipping into madness, writing increasingly unhinged letters to his friends, signed as, 
among others, “God” and “Dionysus.” By January 1889, he lost his grip on reality entirely. In 
the famous, and possibly apocryphal story, Nietzsche saw a coachman whipping his horse. 
Nietzsche ran to the horse, wept, and threw his arms around it. He never regained his sanity. 
His friend Overbeck travelled to Turin to bring him to a psychiatric clinic. The sad rest of 
Nietzsche’s sad life was spent in a state of complete mental decrepitude. He lived on in this 
condition, in his sister’s care in Weimar, until his death in 1900. There is no settled view 
about exactly what precipitated Nietzsche’s breakdown. It has often been held, on rather 
flimsy evidence, to be late-stage syphilis.  But others have claimed it  was the result of a 
meningioma, a kind of brain tumor. Other possibilities have been postulated as well, with no 
definitive resolution.  2
Throughout his life, Nietzsche’s books had a very small circulation. But by the end of 
his  life,  he  was  beginning  to  receive  greater  acclaim,  and he  was  to  have  an  enormous 
influence, not just within philosophy, but in the wider cultural sphere.
III. Work, Style and Methodology
 See Hunemann (2013) for discussion of these issues. 2
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A. The Matter of the Nachlaß
In addition to the many books Nietzsche published or prepared for publication, he 
also left behind a large collection of notes, the so-called Nachlaß.  After this death, these 
were selected, arranged, and published under the title The Will to Power, based on the idea, 
dubious and now discredited, that he was eventually working toward a book with this title.  3
His sister Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche was a key figure in the compilation of this volume, in 
conjunction with Nietzsche’s friend and assistant Heinrich Köselitz. 
The place of these notes in the interpretation of Nietzsche bears some discussion. 
Heidegger  famously  maintained  that  Nietzsche’s  notebooks  contain  the  key  to  his 
philosophy (Heidegger 1961). In some of the most philosophically-sophisticated anglophone 
scholarship on Nietzsche, these notebooks are extensively relied upon.  Other scholars tend 4
to avoid them.  I myself  share the latter predilection,  and treat them with considerable 5
skepticism.  People  write  down all  sorts  of  ideas  in  their  notebooks,  few  of  which  are 
finalized ideas they endorse. They also include their ideas in a preliminary formulation, ideas 
that they are simply toying with, ideas they disagree with and want to refute, notes about 
other  people’s  ideas,  and  so  on.  Given  that  we  don’t  know why  Nietzsche  was  writing 
something down, we cannot assume that what we find in the notebooks are Nietzsche’s own 
ideas, let alone his own considered ideas. Some of these ideas of course make it into the 
 The Italian Nietzsche scholars Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari undertook the philological 3
work that helped to discredit The Will to Power. See Magnus (1988).
 e.g., Nehamas (1985), Richardson (1996), and Reginster (2006) all make extensive use of the 4
notebooks. 
 e.g., Clark (1990), Young (1992), Young (2006). 5
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published work, in roughly similar form. But other ideas only really appear in the notebooks. 
Taken as a whole, the Nachlaß  is a mixed bag: some brilliant ideas, some ill-thought-out 
ones, and some summaries, even downright verbatim transcriptions, of other people’s ideas. 
It is, to my mind, largely a matter of taste and philosophical judgment to what extent one 
wants  to  make  use  of  the  notebooks.  Generally,  those  who  make  a  great  deal  of  the 
notebooks are in philosophical sympathy with the ideas Nietzsche puts forward there, or 
with the particular formulations he gives. Those who are in less sympathy tend to make less 
of  the  notebooks.  Arguments  can  be  given  in  support  of  each approach,  and for  some 
positions in the middle. But readers coming to Nietzsche for the first time must at least be 
made aware of the problematic status of The Will to Power. At the very least, one needs to be 
aware of the scholarly issues it raises. 
B. Style
Nietzsche is  often described as  an “aphorist.”  He will  indeed frequently  write  in 
short passages, ranging from a sentence or two to several paragraphs, in which he explores a 
particular idea. Nietzsche, in diﬀerent works, organizes these aphorisms with greater and 
lesser degrees of thematic cohesiveness. But it is important to remember that he is not only 
an aphorist. He makes use of a variety of diﬀerent literary styles, including: the extended 
essay, treatise, allegory, mock medical case report, autobiography, poetry, and in Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra, a strange quasi-picaresque novel of sorts, with a vaguely biblical air.   6
One thing we immediately notice about Nietzsche’s works is that he doesn’t write in 
a  dry,  sober  philosophical  style.  His  writing  is  highly  literary,  bursting  with  hyperbole, 
 See Nehamas (1985), Ch. 1., for a discussion of the variety of stylistic devices that Nietzsche uses. 6
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humor,  rich metaphors,  and so on.  Some interpretive work on Nietzsche has tended to 
downplay or ignore questions relating to why Nietzsche writes in the rhetorical way that he 
does;  the  focus  is  on  isolable  philosophical  doctrine  instead.  Yet  with  a  philosopher  as 
writerly as Nietzsche, there is a risk of missing his point when we don’t say much about how 
his distinctive literary style interacts with his philosophical goals. As Christopher Janaway 
has stressed, Nietzsche is not just interested in communicating philosophical positions.  He 7
is interested in reaching us at aﬀective level, to get us into states of disgust, fear, admiration, 
and contempt. It is through doing so that he will be able to press us toward reconsidering 
and revaluing our values— and thereby best advance his favored normative agenda. 
C. Truth and Perspectivism
It is sometimes held that Nietzsche repudiates the idea of truth.  This is a highly 8
problematic interpretation, if taken to mean that he denies that there are any truths. To 
begin with, the claim is at best paradoxical and probably incoherent. (After all: Is it true that 
there  are  no  truths?).  The  closest  Nietzsche  comes  to  such  a  denial  is  in  his  early 
unpublished essay “On Truth and Lies in a Non-Moral Sense,” frequently cited as evidence 
for this truth-skeptical interpretation. Even as an interpretive claim about the ideas found 
in this essay, the view that Nietzsche is a truth-denier is very doubtful. His wording is rather 
zealous and incautious, to be sure. And Nietzsche does put forward a skeptical position. But 
it is not a denial of truth, but rather a skeptical denial that most (or any) of our beliefs are 
true.  (This elementary distinction seems lost on the incautious readers of this text,  and 
 Janaway (2007). 7
 Rorty (1989).8
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Nietzsche doesn’t help matters by saying “truths” where what he really seems to mean is 
beliefs about what is true.) Nietzsche’s main thought is the following: Our beliefs never fully 
correspond to the objects they are about. Thus, our beliefs are not fully true. And thus, to 
some degree, our beliefs are systematically falsifying. But notice this is very diﬀerent from 
maintaining that there are no truths.  On the contrary,  such an argument presupposes  the 
existence of truth, and a highly demanding notion of truth at that. 
Whatever  we  make  of  the  “Truth  and  Lies”  essay,  Nietzsche’s  later  work  is 
unequivocal  that  truth exists  (GM I:1).  Nietzsche’s  focus  is  instead on questioning the 9
allegedly unconditional value of truth, as well as the psychology of relentless truth-seeking.  10
Whereas it has been tacitly assumed by virtually all philosophers throughout history that 
truth is an eminently valuable goal, Nietzsche wants to subject this idea to critique. This is 
not because he is doubtful that truth-seeking is, in any sense, a worthwhile enterprise, but 
rather because he wants us to be more critical about its worth and more critical about what 
drives us toward truth. Nietzsche wants to remind us that sometimes it is better, from the 
standpoint  of  life  and  flourishing,  not  to  seek  out  the  truth;  illusion  might  be  highly 
beneficial too (BGE, 1; BGE, 4).  Our continuing overvaluation of truth, he believes, is a 
holdover from Christianity, both in our ascetic devotion to truth-seeking and in the erection 
of  truth as  a  kind of  God-substitute,  with which in  the secular  age  we can beatifically 
commune. 
 Clark (1990) is a seminal treatment of these issues. 9
 See Gemes (1992).10
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Closely  related  to  these  issues  around  truth  is  Nietzsche’s  doctrine  of  so-called 
“perspectivism.”  Nietzsche  never  puts  forward  this  doctrine  in  a  systematic  way.  The 11
notion of a perspective is instead a rich metaphor that Nietzsche draws upon in various 
places. One basic idea of this metaphor is that there is no, as it were, ‘aperspectival' view of 
things. Everything is always seen from some standpoint or other. And in being seen, it is 
always,  to  some  degree,  colored  by  the  aﬀects,  not  judged  through  the  cool  lens  of 
rationality. Nietzsche thus opposes Schopenhauer’s contention that there could be a “pure, 
willless” form of “contemplation” at all (GM, III:12).  Insofar as there is an epistemological 12
position here, the view Nietzsche is oﬀering would seem to be a radicalization and neo-
Kantian naturalization of  a  certain thread from transcendental  idealism,  which sees  the 
subject as playing an important role in constituting the objects of experience and cognition. 
Sometimes the perspectivist  position takes  on a  further  degree of  generality  and 
extremity, to apply to any position on anything whatsoever.  According to what we might 13
call  Extreme  Perspectivism,  every  view  (including  every  philosophical  claim)  is  only  a 
perspective,  including  the  views  put  forward  by  Nietzsche.  Extreme  Perspectivism 14
maintains that there is no standpoint outside perspectives, from which the legitimacy of a 
given perspective might be finally  judged.  If  Nietzsche endorses Extreme Perspectivism, 
 For discussion, see Nehamas (1985), Clark (1990), Anderson (1998), Clark (1998), Gemes (2013). 11
 Clark (1998). 12
 “Facts,” as Nietzsche says at one point in his notebooks, “are precisely what there are not, only 13
interpretations.” (WP, 481). But the context of this oft-quoted sentence, and its status as an 
unpublished notebook entry, make it problematic to rely upon it in the ways it sometimes has been 
in the secondary literature—namely, as the main basis for attributing to Nietzsche a very extreme 
form of perspectivism. For discussion of these diﬃculties, see Gemes (2013).
 This seems to be the position of Nehamas (1985), Ch.2, but he goes on to seek to resolve, on 14
Nietzsche’s behalf, the diﬃcult philosophical puzzles it generates. 
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Nietzsche could be thought to pull the rug out from under the legitimacy of his own views. 
These  are  just  perspectives,  none  with  any  claim  to  final  legitimacy  or  to  potential 
correspondence with how things  “really”  are.  This  Extreme Perspectivist  view is  on the 
wane, and has been subjected to forceful scrutiny.  But wherever we stand on the issue of 15
Extreme Perspectivism, one of the important lessons Nietzsche wants us to take away is not 
about  the  semantics  of  truth  claims (about  which,  in  my view,  he  has  little,  if  anything, 
plausible to say), but instead about the value of certain forms of understanding. In perhaps 
his most famous discussion of perspectivism, Nietzsche champions the epistemic value of 
seeing things from a variety of perspectives: “the more  aﬀects we allow to speak about a 
matter, the more eyes, diﬀerent eyes, we know how to bring to bear on one and the same 
matter, that much more complete will our ‘concept’ of this matter, our ‘objectivity’ be” (GM 
III:12). Philosophers so far have mainly been concerned with getting to The Eternal Truth 
about The Big Questions.  But Nietzsche reminds us  that  there are also interesting and 
important truths about the contents of particular perspectives on these and other questions: 
that is, what people think and have thought, and why they think and have thought it. These 
(perhaps faulty) perspectives are not to be cast aside as mere tissues of error, but are to be 
made central objects of philosophical study.   16
D. Naturalism? 
In  some recent  literature  on  Nietzsche,  the  divide  between naturalism and non-
naturalism has figured prominently. This reflects a broader debate about where exactly to 
 Gemes (2013). 15
 I develop this reading further in Huddleston (forthcoming b). 16
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situate Nietzsche, with respect to his 18th and 19th century predecessors, as well as with 
respect to debates in contemporary philosophy, particularly surrounding moral psychology, 
the philosophy of action, and the philosophy of mind. 
Brian Leiter, in an influential study, has argued that Nietzsche is a “methodological” 
philosophical naturalist—namely, someone who sees the methods of philosophy as needing 
to  be  in  line  with  those  of  the  natural  sciences,  including  psychology.  Such  sciences 17
characteristically seek to explain phenomena, often in terms of their determining causes, by 
reference to naturalistically-respectable entities or processes (whatever exactly those may 
be) or a naturalistically-supported, albeit “speculative” theory of human nature, of the sort 
oﬀered by, for example, Hume. One prominent reading in this vein sees Nietzsche as a drive 
theorist, who explains a variety of human phenomena by way of a certain dynamic, hydraulic 
model of human psychology.  As proponents of the naturalist Nietzsche have stressed, there 18
was important resurgence of neo-Kantian naturalism in the decades before Nietzsche was 
writing, a movement with which he was familiar and sympathetic.  19
In one sense, it should be completely uncontroversial that Nietzsche is a naturalist of 
some  kind.  He  rejects  spurious  supernaturalist  ideas  about  God,  noumenal  selves,  and 
libertarian free will. He sees humans, in important ways, as continuous with the rest of the 
animal  world  (BGE,  230).  But  does  he  subscribe  to  some more  specific  naturalist  view 
beyond this, for example to the suggested idea that the methods of philosophy should be 
continuous with the methods of the natural sciences? Are these methods, in his opinion, 
 Leiter (2002); Leiter (2013). For further defense of a similar form of naturalism, see Kail (2015). 17
 Richardson (1996); Gemes (2009b). 18
 Leiter (2002). For a helpful overview of the complex debates surrounding scientific method in the 19
period leading up to and contemporary with Nietzsche, see Patton (2015). 
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fully adequate to understanding human phenomena?  As with perspectivism, Nietzsche’s 20
explicit remarks on this subject are quite thin.  In terms of his philosophical practice, we 21
often see attempts on Nietzsche’s part to explain in a way that looks to be in line with 
methodological  naturalism.  He  will  sometimes  give  us  explanations  of  complex  human 
beliefs reductively in terms, for example, of psychological needs and motivations, sometimes 
even in terms of physiology (BGE, 187; D, 119; GM, III:15). But we also see him often taking 
a  more  hermeneutical  approach  to  human  phenomena,  where  this  involves  not  just 
explaining  their  causal  antecedents  and  determinants,  but  explaining  them  through 
interpreting  them,  in  such  a  way  as  to  draw  upon  the  framework  of  meanings  and 
significances that are salient for the beings he’s interpreting.  Humans indeed are animals, 22
but they are human animals, who operate in a historically-mediated set of cultural practices, 
 The non-naturalist Nietzsche has taken various forms in the secondary literature. One prominent 20
non-naturalist suggestion, developed by Clark and Dudrick (2012) is that a normative dimension is 
central to Nietzsche’s philosophical enterprise, and to the sorts of accounts he gives of the human 
psyche in particular. While I am sympathetic to the importance of the normative (Huddleston 2017), 
my own sense is that best foil for methodological naturalism is a broader methodology that allows 
that there are distinctive, epistemically respectable modes of understanding present in the “human 
sciences” [Geisteswissenschaften] (a term used by Dilthey) that don’t fit the naturalistic model. 
 We must also bear in mind, even when he mentions “scientific method,” that Wissenschaft in 21
German is a very broad sort of domain, encompassing not just the hard sciences and the social 
sciences, but systematic types of scholarly intellectual inquiry in history, classics, music, and various 
other humanities subjects. (As also noted by Leiter (2002), Ch. 2). Thus, we must be careful about 
just what we take Nietzsche to be praising when he praises the “scientific method” (A, 59) or the 
“procedures of science” (HH I, 635). Classical philology has a “scientific method” in the relevant 
sense. 
 Consider, for example, Nietzsche’s etymological enquiries in GM I about evaluative terminology 22
and categories, or his discussion of the self-interpretation of guilt in GM II, or of ascetic ideal as 
oﬀering man a ‘meaning’ [Sinn] and why such a meaning would be appealing in GM III. Such 
interpretation is conceived by Nietzsche as something that we do as philosophers, but also 
something that goes on, pre-theoretically, at the level of our practices and the level of our self-
understandings (e.g., GM II:12). The pervasiveness of interpretation in Nietzsche’s work is an 
important point stressed by Nehamas (1985). See also Berry (2011), who also stresses the role of 
interpretation, using the model of philology as the “art of reading well,” understood as being able to 
“read facts without falsifying them through interpretation, without letting the desire to understand 
make you lose caution, patience, subtlety. Philology as ephexis in interpretation” (A, 52). 
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in terms of which they understand (and he stresses, often misunderstand) themselves and 
what they are doing.  23
Nietzsche  has  considerable  admiration  for  natural  science  surely,  but  it  is  more 
doubtful whether he takes it to be the sole privileged standpoint from which to lay the 
groundwork for a philosophical inquiry into complex human phenomena. There is, in my 
view,  an  equally  strong  aﬃnity  with  a  more  hermeneutic  tradition,  which seeks  to  give 
interpretations of the sort just mentioned. Such a view needn’t be positing mysterious, non-
natural entities. For its claim is not metaphysical, but epistemic: it maintains that there are 
modes of understanding beyond those employed in the empirical natural sciences, which 
amount to distinctive forms of understanding relevant to comprehending human beings and 
their practices. 
So while Neo-Kantian naturalism was in the air, so too was the careful hermeneutical 
tradition in which Nietzsche was raised as a philologist. When we look to these influences, 
as well as his own philosophical practice, I think the correct conclusion is that Nietzsche is 
a philosopher who proves diﬃcult to categorize along the non-naturalist vs. naturalist axis. 
It’s  not  clear  that  much is  gained  by  doing  so  either:  We miss  a  good deal  of  what  is 
philosophically interesting and distinctive in Nietzsche’s work if we try to shoehorn all his 
explanations  into  a  purely  naturalist  framework—or,  for  that  matter,  if  we  ignore  the 
interesting  ways  in  which  he  was  in  dialogue  with  the  science  of  his  day,  and  usefully 
applying insights of psychology and physiology to better understand what humans are up to.  
 For this emphasis on the role of culture, see Janaway (2007). From the fact that many of these self-23
understandings are misunderstandings, it doesn’t follow that we understand these creatures better by 
opting just for a naturalistic explanation of how they’ve been led to that misunderstanding. 
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IV. The Birth of Tragedy and the Death of Tragic Culture
Nietzsche’s  first  book  was  published  during  the  time  that  he  was  Professor  of 
Classical Philology at the University of Basel. The book is a strange concoction: On some 
level, it is a work of classical philology, although it has very little documentation for the 
dramatic claims it advances. On some level too, it is a treatise in aesthetics, dealing with 
issues about two dueling artistic forces, which Nietzsche labels the “Apollonian” and the 
“Dionysian,”  issues  about  our  experience  of  tragedy,  and  issues  about  the  contribution 
diﬀerent aspects of the drama make to that experience. And it is also a work of cultural 
criticism, diagnosing a crisis in modern culture, and proposing Richard Wagner, and his re-
creation of tragic drama as music drama, as the solution to this crisis. 
Let  us  begin  with  its  philological  dimension.  We best  see  the  book  against  the 
backdrop of  a  certain  conventional  wisdom about  Greek art  as  radiating  calm serenity. 
Winckelmann is  a  notable  proponent  of  such an  outlook in  his  Geschichte  der  Kunst  des 
Alterthums (1764, "The History of Ancient Art”). Nietzsche’s main historical claim is that 
this is a misleading image of Greece and the Ancient Greeks. They were a people who were 
acutely aware of the horrors of life, who thus needed to interpose a veil between themselves 
and  this  reality  in  order  to  make  life  bearable.  The  Olympian  Gods  are  mythological 
creations that seek to do this, and tragedy itself served a similar function, representing the 
horror of life, but also distancing us from it in certain aestheticizing ways (BT, 3).  
Nietzsche has a further series of claims about the trajectory of tragedy as a genre. He 
maintains that the height of tragedy came with Aeschylus and Sophocles, and then by the 
time of Euripides, tragedy declines as a genre (BT, 11). Nietzsche’s favored explanation for 
this is that tragedy becomes increasingly rationalistic, a failing that Nietzsche attributes to 
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something  he  calls  “aesthetic  Socratism.”  (BT,  12).  In  Euripides,  matters  become  too 
rationalistic, with gods swooping in to fix things, and ends getting tied up overly neatly. This 
glosses  over  the  incomprehensibility  and  messiness  that  characterize  the  tragic  side  of 
human life, and that should be central to, and reflected in, good tragic drama. 
When tragedy is discussed in philosophical aesthetics, a central issue is the so-called 
“paradox of tragedy.” Why, despite the terrible things it depicts, are we drawn to tragedy? A 
simple solution would be to say that these events are merely fictional. No one is actually 
dying. But this solution is unsatisfactory, because through the fictional scenarios it presents, 
tragedy, as Nietzsche realizes, intimates a deeper, and ultimately terrible, truth about the 
world: that individuals can be crushed by titantic forces beyond their control.  Why do we 24
want  to  see  this  truth  represented?  Nietzsche’s  solution  to  the  paradox  of  tragedy  is 
philosophically-distinctive: It focuses on tragedy’s power to aﬀord us a form of existential 
consolation. Tragedy confronts us with this cruel truth, but thanks to its use of illusion, and 
particularly  its  imposition  of  a  form-giving  aesthetic  order  on  this  horror,  it  renders  it 
bearable,  even  appealing.  Tragedy  does  so  by  inviting  us  to  take  up  a  highly  removed 
perspective at odds with our usual one. Nietzsche will sometimes describe this perspective 
as that of an amoral ‘Artist-God,’ (BT, “Attempt at Self-Criticism,” 5) or of a wanton child, 
building  sandcastles  and  then  knocking  them down for  fun  (BT,  24).  For  such  beings, 
creation and destruction are aesthetic phenomena. It is from this perspective, which we can 
temporarily occupy as spectators of the tragic drama, that the events seem to have a certain 
meaning—not, according to Nietzsche, a moral meaning, but a purely aesthetic meaning, an 
eﬀect heightened all the more by the aestheticizing language and presentation of the tragic 
 For a helpful discussion of the connection between tragedy and truth, see Janaway (2014). 24
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scenario.  Thanks  to  this  confluence  of  factors,  existence,  on  the  tragic  stage,  gets 
transfigured, in such a way that it seems to have an aesthetic “justification.”  How exactly we 25
carry this consolation into life outside the theater is another matter, but Nietzsche thinks 
its subliminal eﬀect is to wed us ever more to life. 
In addition to these philological and aesthetic projects,  The Birth of  Tragedy  has a 
cultural goal in mind. Nietzsche’s eye is ultimately on this problem: We moderns are in a 
crisis in which we lack the sort of existential framework of values that could give meaning to 
human life.  This spiritual poverty has about come largely as the result of the dominance of 26
a certain sort of Socratic rationalism that has undone the importance of illusion and myth. 
At this early point in his career, Nietzsche was very enmeshed with Richard Wagner, who 
saw a similar sort of crisis in modernity and wanted to create an antidote through his music 
dramas. Wagner envisaged Der Ring des Niebelungen as drawing on a wellspring of sources to 
create a new mythology for the modern era. We see in The Birth of Tragedy  optimism on 
Nietzsche’s  part  that  this  Wagnerian  program might  stand  a  chance  of  success  at  this 
almost-impossibly-ambitious task. Although Nietzsche eventually came to see that Wagner’s 
program was  doomed  to  failure,  Nietzsche  in  essence  took  up  the  mantle  himself,  in 
thinking we need to “revalue” all values, an important aspect of his project which we will 
return to in what follows. 
V. Positivism: Human, All Too Human and Daybreak
 See Geuss (1999), Came (2005), and Anderson (2009) for discussion of these issues. Nietzsche 25
writes: “…we may very well assume we are already images and artistic projections for the true creator 
of art, and that our highest dignity lies in our significance as works of art—for only as an aesthetic 
phenomenon is existence and the world eternally justified…” (BT, 5). 
 See Gemes and Sykes (2014). 26
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Following The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche’s main philosophical focus was on a series of 
four  essays,  published in the mid-1870s,  and compiled together  under  the title  Untimely 
Meditations. Their themes range from Bildung [self-cultivation/ culture], to the value of the 
study of history, to Wagner’s plans for Bayreuth. Although there is a great deal of important 
material in these texts, I will need to leave aside discussion of them for reasons of space. I 
will focus instead on Nietzsche’s next two books Human, All too Human and Daybreak and 
treat them together. The former was published in 1878, supplemented by two further parts 
in the few years following. Daybreak followed on its heels in 1881. In both works, we see 
Nietzsche moving toward the aphoristic style for which he is best known.
Around the time of Human, All too Human, Nietzsche resigned his Professorship in 
Basel on the grounds of ill-health. He was, as already mentioned in the biographical section 
of this article, living on this modest pension and devoting himself to writing. Nietzsche was 
shedding  Wagner’s  and  Schopenhauer’s  influence  and  was  beginning  to  come into  own 
philosophically. While we can see important anticipations of later Nietzschean themes in 
the  Untimely  Meditations,  one  still  has  the  sense  of  Nietzsche  being  in  Wagner’s  and 
Schopenhauer’s  shadow and  asserting  himself  relatively  cautiously.  But  by  the  time  of 
Human, All  Too Human,  he is reaching philosophical independence to a far greater degree 
than he had done so far. Daybreak continues down such a path. 
Human, All Too Human and Daybreak are often classified together as representative of 
Nietzsche’s “positivistic” period. He oﬀers physiological or mechanistic explanations of a 
variety of phenomena. This amounts to a pendulum shift of sorts, with respect to The Birth 
of Tragedy, where he goes in for obscure concepts— the “primal one-ness” [Ur-Eine] most 
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notoriously (BT, 1).  These positivistic books are more sober and do away with such “artist’s 27
metaphysics,” a term Nietzsche will come to use to denigrate his approach in The Birth (BT, 
“Attempt,” 2).  28
One of the most important concepts to emerge from Human All  Too Human is the 
idea of the “free spirit.” (Indeed the book is subtitled: A Book for Free Spirits). Such a person
—the free spirit—is able to liberate herself from the shackles of tradition and convention.  29
Nietzsche  will  make  use  of  the  contrastive  image  of  “the  herd,”  which  will  become 
important in a number of his later texts: Whereas most people are content just to follow 
what is done around them (“the herd”), the “free spirit” will make her own way, particularly 
when it comes to exposing the values in the surrounding culture to critical scrutiny. (We see 
various echoes of this important idea in later existentialist thinkers.) 
Daybreak  [Morgenröte]  (also sometimes translated as Dawn)  continues in much the 
same spirit. It is subtitled Thoughts on the Prejudices of Morality, and in it, we see Nietzsche 
playing the role of “free spirit” himself and subjecting the predominant value system in the 
west—Judeo-Christian morality—to extended critical scrutiny.  As he will later write in Ecce 
Homo, “With this book [Daybreak] my campaign against morality begins” (EH, “Daybreak”). 
It is where Nietzsche will begin to style himself as a “denier” of this morality: 
 The extent to which he actually buys into this metaphysics is less clear. We know from his 27
notebooks that he was doubtful about a number of aspects of Schopenhauer’s metaphysics, to which 
the (apparent) metaphysics of The Birth of Tragedy shares some seeming aﬃnities. See “On 
Schopenhauer” (ENB). 
 Nietzsche appends this “Attempt at Self-Criticism” to BT in his revised 1886 edition. 28
 For further discussion of the “free spirit,” see Reginster (2003).29
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I deny morality as I deny alchemy that is, I deny their premises: but I do not deny 
that  there  have  been  alchemists  who  believed  in  these  premises  and  acted  in 
accordance with them…It goes without saying that I do not deny— unless I am a fool
—that many actions called immoral ought to be avoided and resisted, or that many 
called  moral  ought  to  be  done  and  encouraged—but  I  think  the  one  should  be 
encouraged and the other avoided for diﬀerent reasons than hitherto (D, 103). 
He is not claiming that all the particular prescriptions of morality are wrong. But he instead 
is making a claim about the justifications that have hitherto been given for moral actions. 
These stand in need of revision. He continues: “We must learn to think diﬀerently in order 
perhaps very late on, to achieve even more: to feel diﬀerently” (D, 103). Nietzsche’s concern is 
thus not just with our explicit thoughts or reasoned decisions about what we morally should 
do, but with our aﬀects and attitudes. Many of those fall unthinkingly into step with Judeo-
Christian morality. But by subjecting this morality to greater critical scrutiny, he thereby 
hopes to lessen (at least for some of us) the aﬀective grip of its ideals and values. 
Nietzsche’s groundbreaking theme of power as an important motivator of action (D, 
348, 360) will also become prominent in Daybreak. In Human, All  Too Human, by contrast, 
Nietzsche will sometimes be pressing the simplistic assumption that we are driven solely by 
hedonic motivations, meaning that everything that we do is ultimately driven by a desire for 
our own satisfaction. But by Daybreak, Nietzsche will note, far more interestingly, that we 
are often driven by a desire for power instead, and that we often sacrifice pleasure for power. 
We, for example, do things that are highly challenging, not because of pleasure, but because 
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of the power we have in facing obstacles and overcoming them.  As we shall see, Nietzsche 30
will  later develop this theme is  a very sophisticated way in On the  Genealogy of  Morality, 
where  he  will  try  to  give  a  psychological  explanation  of  what  might  drive  us  toward 
asceticism, where our power is turned back against ourselves, and where we seek to snuﬀ 
out our own drives.
 
VI. The Gay Science
Nietzsche published The Gay Science  in 1882. Stylistically, it is a masterpiece, apart 
from some ill-judged and rather uneven poetry. It is in the vein of Human, All Too Human and 
Daybreak  in  being  aphoristic  rather  than  a  treatise  on  a  focused  topic.  Its  title  signals 
Nietzsche’s move away, to some extent, from the positivism of his previous two books, but 
even more so, his explicit volte face from the pessimistic Schopenhauerian outlook he had 
previously accepted in The Birth of Tragedy a decade before. The Gay Science is seeking a form 
of “science” [Wissenschaft] that will be joyful, centered in particular around the idea of life 
aﬃrmation—finding  life  as  something  valuable  to  be  celebrated,  not  something  to  be 
condemned, as Schopenhauer would have it. 
Nietzsche gives us the ultimate image, and limiting case, of this life aﬃrmation with 
his idea of the eternal recurrence, and the potential responses to it:
What  if  some day  or  night  a  demon were  to  steal  after  you  into  your  loneliest 
loneliness and say to you: “This life as you now live it and have lived it, you will have 
to live once more and innumerable times more…
 Nietzsche’s psychology of the will to power is explored further in Reginster (2006) and in 30
Katsafanas (2013). 
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Would you not throw yourself down and gnash you teeth and curse the demon who 
spoke thus? Or have you once experienced a tremendous moment when you would 
have  answered  him:  “You  are  a  god  and  never  have  I  heard  anything  more 
divine.” (GS, 341). 
This  immediately  presents  various  philosophical  puzzles.  Does  Nietzsche see  the 
demon  as  announcing  something  that  is  actually  true  of  existence—a  kind  of  cyclical 
cosmology? Or is the point instead to oﬀer an imagined scenario to gauge our reaction? A 
few dissenting voices aside, a consensus has emerged in recent literature that Nietzsche is 
not presenting this  as  the correct cosmology.  He is  more interested in the ethical  and 31
existential  implications  of  this  “thought”  of  the  eternal  recurrence.  But  even  if  it  is  a 
thought-experiment, is it coherent enough to imagine? Some have raised concerns on this 
front, and suggested that even as a thought-experiment it needs to be taken, non-literally, 
along the lines of the question, “If you had it to do over, would you marry me again?”  The 32
point of this question is to assess one’s present marriage, not to throw up philosophical 
brain  teasers  about  multiple  marriages  to  the  same  person,  time  travel,  and  the  like. 
Nietzsche, in presenting the thought of the eternal recurrence and dramatizing potential 
reactions to it, is primarily interested in giving us an image of what full-throated aﬃrmation 
 e.g., Loeb (2013) for a cosmological reading of the eternal recurrence. 31
 This nice example is due to Clark (1990). 32
Page    of  21 47
would be. It is not that there actually are repeating cycles; each of us has, as the saying goes, 
only one life to live. Can we accept this? Or will we long for a diﬀerent and better life?  33
Christianity of course promises us a better life in heaven than the one we are living 
on earth.  For Nietzsche,  its  promises are empty,  and its  theology bankrupt.  Perhaps no 
catch-phrase is more associated with Nietzsche than ‘God is Dead.’ When we understand 
this in the broad way Nietzsche intended, those words might be thought to encapsulate his 
philosophy,  and  his  place  in  the  history  of  philosophy,  better  than  anything  else. 
Philosophers  before  Nietzsche  had  been  skeptics  about  conventional  religion.  Voltaire, 
Hume, Schopenhauer and others were dubious of a theistic worldview. And the idea of a 
‘death of  God’  was anticipated already by Hegel  and others.  But no philosopher before 
Nietzsche understood the ‘death of God’ in as radical a fashion. For Nietzsche, the ‘death of 
God’  is  not a claim about the non-existence of a  certain metaphysical  being,  though of 
course Nietzsche thinks there is no such being. But rather it is about a broader crisis of 
values in Western culture. Whereas other philosophers saw a way of salvaging something 
like our ordinary form of other-regarding morality from the ashes of Christianity’s demise, 
Nietzsche thinks that the “death of  God” calls  our continuing reliance on this  morality 
radically into question. 
Nietzsche  dramatizes  this  announcement  of  the  “death  of  God”  by  telling  of  a 
“madman” who goes, with lantern lit in the “bright morning hours,” into a marketplace to 
announce the death of God. His listeners are uncomprehending, as he conveys his prophetic 
message:
 For further discussion of the eternal recurrence, see Soll (1980), Nehamas (1985), Clark (1990), 33
Anderson (2005), Huddleston (forthcoming a). 
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“Whither is God?” [the madman] cried; “I will tell you. We have killed him—you and 
I. All of us are his murderers. But how did we do this? How could we drink up the 
sea? Who gave us the sponge to wipe away the entire horizon? What were we doing 
when we unchained this earth from its sun? Whither is it moving now? Whither are 
we  moving?  Away  from  all  suns?  Are  we  not  plunging  continually?  Backward, 
sideward, forward, in all directions? Is there still any up or down? Are we not straying 
as through an infinite nothing? Do we not feel the breath of empty space? Has it not 
become colder? Is not night continually closing in on us?” (GS, 125). 
The Gay Science is largely about maintaining our joyfulness and capacity for life-aﬃrmation in 
the face of the knowledge that this world is not governed by a benevolent deity according to 
a cosmic plan. The world is a mixture of good and bad. It is our choice whether we accept 
this package and get on cheerfully with life, or whether we stew in dismay, rancor, and self-
pity, and wish things were diﬀerent.  34
VII. Thus Spoke Zarathustra
Thus  Spoke  Zarathustra  is  perhaps  the  most  unusual  book  in  Nietzsche’s  corpus, 
though the competition for that label is stiﬀ. He composed it from 1883 to 1885 in separately 
published sections, with the culmination of Part III usually thought to be the originally-
envisaged ending, and then Part IV an addition. Following Nietzsche’s suggestion that Thus 
Spoke Zarathustra is a “tragedy” of sorts, it is sometimes thought that Part IV is the “satyr 
 It is not clear why Nietzsche expects the question to be quite so polarizing. Couldn’t we opt for a 34
middle-ground position, celebrating some things and condemning others? 
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play” following the tragedy, though the interrelation of its parts remains a matter of some 
dispute.  In standard editions of the book, one will now find all four sections together. 35
As already discussed, Nietzsche was an exceptionally literary writer in all his works. 
But this is perhaps his most self-consciously literary eﬀort. It takes the form of an episodic 
novel, which will seek to fuse philosophy and literature. In linguistic style, it has an aﬀected, 
archaic air, with resonances of the Luther Bible. One of the key interpretive questions is 
whether it is a parody of a religious book, or meant to be taken “straight,” as a kind of quasi-
religious-mystical  outpouring.  My  own  view  is  that  it  is  downright  unbearable  (some 36
choice passages aside) unless one takes it as a rather arch sendup of a religious book, and 
even then it is tough going.
The basic narrative line of the book follows the character Zarathustra, modeled, at 
least  in  name,  after  the  Persian  prophet  Zoroaster.  The  book  begins  with  Zarathustra 
coming down from his mountain home. The narrative follows Zarathustra, his travels, his 
trailing menagerie, and his reception by those to whom he conveys his message. It consists 
largely in a series of speeches in a grandiose mock-Biblical style, complete with its “Verily[s]” 
and its concluding “Thus Spoke Zarathustra’s.” The themes of many of these speeches are 
broadly resonant with Nietzschean themes we see elsewhere. This can lead us to think that 
Zarathustra should be regarded as a straightforward mouthpiece for Nietzsche’s own views. 
On some level, he clearly is. But the book is operating on two levels. It is trying to propound 
new Nietzschean values, and it is also the story of a character who is trying to propound new 
 On the interrelation of its parts, see Nehamas (2000), Loeb (2010), Tevenar (2013). 35
 Note what Nietzsche says about it in Ecce Homo: “Here no ‘prophet’ is speaking, none of those 36
gruesome hybrids of sickness and will to power whom people call founders of religions. Above all, 
one must hear aright the tone that comes from this mouth, the halcyon tone, lest one do wretched 
injustice to the meaning of its wisdom” (EH, “Preface, 4). 
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values, to an audience that is at times uncomprehending, even hostile. Interpretive caution 
is in order, as Nietzsche may have dramatized this curious character and his attempt to 
disseminate his views precisely to allow for a degree of ironic distance.  37
One of the book’s most recognizable themes is that of the Übermensch, an ideal that 
really only appears in Zarathustra, and in Nietzsche’s retrospective discussion of the book in 
later work. The term presents considerable issues of translation: “Superman” has a vaguely 
comical ring, and the neologisms “overhuman” and “overman” strike an odd chord as well. 
The basic idea of the Übermensch is of a higher type of being who is going to transcend our 
present miserable human condition. This condition takes two problematic forms. The first 
form is Christianity, particularly its suspicion about and disdain for the things of this world, 
and its attempt to anchor the value and meaning of life in another world beyond this one 
(TSZ, “On the Afterworldly”).  The second, and in many ways worse form is seen in the 
figure of the “last man”.  In the Prologue, Zarathustra warns of this approaching spectre, 38
who is  concerned with pleasure,  safety,  and comfort,  and has no interest  in striving for 
anything  great  (TSZ,  “Prologue”).  Indeed,  such  a  creature  is  left  utterly  unmoved  by 
greatness: “‘What is love? What is creation? What is longing? What is a star?’ thus asks the 
last man, and he blinks” (TSZ, “Prologue,” 5). As a way of counteracting these two quite 
diﬀerent pathologies, Zarathustra preaches the Übermensch, who is supposed to be the  (new) 
“meaning of  the earth” (TSZ, “Prologue,”  3).  Whereas Christianity disdains this  life  and 
world  and  can  find  nothing  of  real  redemptive  value  in  it,  the  last  man  finds  nothing 
worthwhile that really excites his admiration and awe, devoted as he is to simple creature 
 Pippin (1988).37
 “Last human” is a better translation of letzter Mensch, but the former is the conventional 38
anglophone designation of this character. 
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comforts.  The  Übermensch,  as  the  epitome  of  human  excellence,  seeks  to  answer  both 
problems: it gives us something i) this-worldly, that ii) provides a worthy object of reverence, 
and that iii) confers redemptive meaning on existence. 
Another key theme in the book is that of the eternal recurrence, which we have 
already  discussed  in  connection  with  The  Gay  Science.  As  I  mentioned,  it  is  sometimes 
maintained that Nietzsche means this as a cosmological claim. The evidence in Zarathustra is 
better  for  this,  but it  is  not straightforward.  At various points  in the book,  the eternal 
recurrence  is  presented as  a  metaphysical  doctrine,  characterizing  the  supposed cyclical 
nature of existence (e.g., TSZ, “On the Vision and the Riddle”). But that is of course within 
the literary frame of a book filled with numerous allegories and parables. Nietzsche does 
maintain that the “eternal recurrence” is fundamental to the book (EH, “Zarathustra”), but 
it is less clear whether he means by that the cosmology, taken literally, or instead the ethic of 
life aﬃrmation that the idea embodies.  39
When  he  turns  back  to  reflecting  on  his  own  works  and  their  contribution  to 
philosophy,  Zarathustra  is  the book Nietzsche heaps the most praise on.  He notoriously 
claims that it is the greatest gift that has been given to humanity (EH, “Preface,” 4), and that 
chairs will be devoted to the study of it. After a very small first print run, the book, within a 
few decades, would became hugely popular. It had an enthusiastic reception in some artistic 
circles. It oﬀered inspiration to Mahler, Strauss, Kubrick, and many other great artists. It 
undeniably contains some beautiful poetry. Yet in anglophone interpretations of Nietzsche, 
the book tends to be downplayed, if not entirely ignored. A few Nietzsche scholars have 
vigorously championed its importance, and suggested that it is where we are to look to find 
 Loeb (2013) makes a case for the cosmological interpretation. 39
Page    of  26 47
the key to Nietzsche’s philosophy.  At the very least, the book is highly polarizing among 40
philosophical readers of Nietzsche. 
As an aesthetic whole, the book, to my mind, is a marked failure. The early Nietzsche 
was in Wagner’s shadow. With his break from Wagner, and Wagner’s death (in February 1883, 
the  year  Nietzsche  began  the  composition  of  Zarathustra),  Nietzsche  claimed he  would 
become to a good extent Wagner’s “heir.”  Perhaps he took this as meaning he would take 41
up the Wagnerian program of oﬀering us a fusion of art, religion, and philosophy, that would 
attempt to grant us a new mythology for modern life, and infuse it with a significance and 
meaning that it was lacking. This is what he attempted. But Nietzsche’s literary talents lay 
elsewhere. He simply did not have the requisite creative skill to pull this oﬀ, much as he 
tried.  He is  much more  in  his  element  in  writing  beautiful,  penetrating  aphorisms  and 
essays. Though it is true that many have found Zarathustra Nietzsche’s great contribution to 
world literature,  others—I count myself  among them—are as  yet  immune to its  alleged 
charms. Nietzsche, at his best, could be a real master of imagery, allusion, humor, and other 
literary devices. But in Zarathustra he goes grotesquely overboard, and produces a book that 
is pompous, overstuﬀed, and downright boring.  Yet opinions on its merits clearly diﬀer. As 42
I say, many great artists have found inspiration in it, and perhaps it is a matter of taste. 
VIII. Beyond Good and Evil
 e.g., Loeb (2010)40
 Letter to Heinrich Köselitz, 19 Feb. 188341
 Perhaps Nietzsche heaps such great praise on it because he unconsciously recognizes that it is his 42
greatest failure. For the suggestion of Nietzsche’s lapses in self-criticism when it comes to 
Zarathustra, see Tanner (1994). 
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With Nietzsche’s next book, Beyond Good and Evil, he returns to the literary style of 
which he was a master: the aphorism. The book is divided into 9 sections, which tie these 
aphorisms together, and concludes with a selection of poetry. Thematically, it treats a huge 
range  of  topics,  ranging  from  conventional  philosophical  issues  in  metaphysics  and 
epistemology, to religion, to art and culture, to society and politics, to moral psychology. The 
book is subtitled Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future, and this gives us a good hint about what 
is arguably its core theme: a methodological conception of what Nietzsche’s preferred form 
of philosophy would be. 
Nietzsche sets up a distinction between those he calls “philosophical laborers” on the 
one hand and “genuine philosophers”  on the other.  Genuine philosophers,  according to 
Nietzsche, are those that create values (BGE, 211). By contrast, philosophical laborers are 
those who “determine and press into formulas, whether in the realm of logic or political 
(moral)  thought or art,  some great data of valuations–that is,  former positings of values, 
creations of value which have become dominant and are for a time called ‘truths.’” Such 
venerable figures as Kant and Hegel  he brands as philosophical  laborers.  This can seem 
bizarre and unfair, when we think of their tremendously innovative philosophical ideas. But 
Nietzsche sees  them both as  basically  conservative  figures:  taking received ideas,  giving 
them a rational veneer, and making them the heart of their philosophical systems. Kant, on 
Nietzsche’s view, will try to give philosophical articulation to the morality of common-sense 
and fight a rear-guard action to make room for God, immortality, and free will, while Hegel 
will  try  to  justify  the norms imbedded in  our  present  practice,  seeking to  give  rational 
sanction to what is in eﬀect a warmed-over version of Christianity. 
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It’s well and good to say that genuine philosophers will be concerned with creating 
values. But what exactly does this mean? Nietzsche is most plausibly read, I would suggest, 
as thinking of values on a social model.  He is saying that social value systems are ultimately 43
human creations. We have been operating with a Christian moral value system for nearly 
two millennia. For its time, this was innovative (which is not to say everything innovative is 
thereby good, Christianity being a case in point.) But its time has now utterly past, and it 
will fall to forward-looking “philosophers of the future” (BGE, 210) to give us a new value 
system that will replace it. They are “commanders and legislators, they say, ‘thus it shall be!’ 
They first determine the Whither and For What of man…” (BGE, 211). 
For all its talk of “value-creation” as the work of genuine philosophers, Beyond Good 
and Evil spends rather little time actually oﬀering new values. Instead, it spends quite a bit 
of  time  in  a  critical-anthropological  vein,  working  through  various  received  ideas  and 
subjecting them to scrutiny.  Nietzsche sees there as being an important connection here 44
between the critical-anthropological and the creative enterprises. It is by experiencing and 
understanding a range of existing values that we are then in a good position to create new 
ones: 
Perhaps [the genuine philosopher]  himself  must have been critic and skeptic and 
dogmatist and historian and also poet and collector and traveler and solver of riddles 
and moralist and seer and "free spirit" and almost everything in order to pass through 
the whole range of human values and value feelings and to be able to see with many 
 I discuss this further in Huddleston (2014). 43
 Not all of these ideas are directly about values, but even behind abstruse and seemingly remote 44
metaphysical ideas Nietzsche thinks that there are value commitments to be found (BGE, 6). 
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diﬀerent  eyes  and  consciences,  from a  height  and  into  every  distance,  from the 
depths into every height, from a nook into every expanse (BGE, 211).
This is what Nietzsche himself tries to do in his mature work. For this reason, the sort of 
value creation is not completely ex nihilio, nor is it completely a priori. One needs to survey 
what values there have been in order to have a good sense of what better values there might 
be.
IX. On Genealogy of Morality
Shortly after completing Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche begins his masterwork On 
the Genealogy of Morality, which expands on themes from Beyond Good and Evil’s section on 
the “Natural History of Morals.” The Genealogy is Nietzsche’s most cohesive book, in terms 
of exploring a relatively focused theme. It is divided into three essays, each of which treats a 
diﬀerent  aspect  of  Judeo-Christian  morality,  broadly-understood.  Nietzsche  treats  this 
morality as an historical phenomenon: It is not written into the fabric of the universe. It is 
instead something that came to be at a particular time in history, in the process displacing a 
diﬀerent pagan value system that held sway before it. Nietzsche dubs his form of historical 
inquiry  “genealogy,”  thereby  indicating  his  interest  in  tracing  roots.  But  whereas  most 
genealogies (of, say, a king, or a race horse, or show dog) valorize the object of the genealogy, 
by showing a value-preserving chain of succession, the point of Nietzsche’s genealogy will be 
to call the object of the genealogy into question.  We need, as he says, “a critique of moral 45
values, for once the value of these values must itself be called into question—and for this we 
 Geuss (1994).45
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need a knowledge of the conditions and circumstances out of which they have grown, under 
which they have developed and shifted’ (GM, “Preface,” 6). Although genealogy is partly a 
descriptive  historical-anthropological  enterprise,  this  is  ultimately  in  the  service  of  the 
normative  goal  of  assessing  the  values  we  today  may  unreflectively  endorse—selflessness, 
humility, charity, compassion, and the like. Such an assessment can then pave the way to new 
values, at least for some people. 
The Genealogy’s  First Essay charts a certain radical shift in values. In the classical 
Greek world, the dominant value system was organized around the categories of “good” and 
“bad.” These are not particularly moralized notions; they are instead indications of status, 
capability, and merit.  The good are the strong, brave, high-stationed, noble, healthy, and 
beautiful. The bad are their opposite: the weak, craven, base, common, sick, and ugly (GM, 
I:2). According to the reigning outlook, the ‘good’ are doing well as people, the ‘bad’ are doing 
poorly as people. This is, in somewhat caricatured terms, the perspective of the pagan world. 
Judeo-Christianity marks a watershed moment in human history, because it overturns this 
previous  hierarchy.  As the result  of  something Nietzsche refers  to as  the “slave revolt,” 
values get turned upside down. Those previously looked down upon (the weak, sick, etc.) 
now claim the mantle of merit for themselves. (“Blessed are the meek, for they will inherit 
the earth” (Matthew 5:5)). They claim for themselves the title of “good,” and brand those 
who were previously “good” as evil. The key psychological mechanism at work is something 
that Nietzsche refers to as ressentiment (GM, I:10). This is a form of vengefulness that in the 
weak is unable to discharge itself outwardly. The weak seethe with this ressentiment against 
those  with  power  over  them.  But  because  they  cannot  take  adequate  revenge,  they 
compensate themselves with an “imaginary” form of revenge, in the form of a worldview, 
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whereby they get  lauded for  their  previously  denigrated traits,  and their  oppressors  get 
denigrated  for  their  previously  lauded  traits.  The  name  “slave  revolt”  is  somewhat 46
misleading, since Nietzsche sees the key movers of this revolt as being the “priestly people,” 
namely the Jews (GM, I:10). Nietzsche’s claim here is highly incendiary, and traﬃcs in ugly 
anti-Semitic  stereotypes  about  Jewish  conspiracies.  Does  he  accept  these  stereotypes 
himself, or is he using them for rhetorical purposes, needling an anti-Semitic audience with 
the idea that their beloved value system is an invention of the people they hate?  In general, 47
how literally we are supposed to take this idea of the slave revolt? It is very doubtful that it 
is supposed to be a plan by conscious design. But as an indication of a substantial historical 
change, it makes more sense: The worldviews of Homeric Greece and of the New Testament 
are drastically diﬀerent, in many respects, diametrically opposed. Whether Nietzsche puts 
his finger on exactly why this change happened, it certainly seems right that there has been 
a marked change.
The Second Essay continues Nietzsche’s genealogical exploration, focusing on a loose 
web of themes: guilt, bad conscience, punishment, memory, promising, and autonomy. These 
do not sit entirely neatly together. But this is part of Nietzsche’s point. The development of 
humans and their culture in these respects has not been thanks to a single driving force, but 
is the product of diﬀerent factors coalescing in complex ways. The Second Essay gives a 
story about our transition from the condition of being wild animals to the condition of 
being  humans  in  civilization.  This  change  requires  what  Nietzsche  thinks  of  as 
internalization, whereby many of our impulses, particularly our aggressive impulses, need to 
 For further discussion of the First Essay, see Bittner (1994), Reginster (1997), Migotti (1998), May 46
(1999), Leiter (2002), Gemes (2006), Janaway (2007), Wallace (2007), May (2011), Schuringa (2014). 
 Gemes (2006), Anderson (2011). 47
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be turned inward. In the process of becoming “tamed” in this way, the animal man has “beat 
itself raw on the bars of its cage” (GM, II:16). A second major theme is that of memory and 
promising, and its relation to punishment. As we become more complex creatures with a 
memory,  we  are  able  to  make  promises  and  hold  each  other  accountable  for  these 
promises.  This allows for indebtedness, whereby we recall something we owe to another 48
person,  and  what  this  other  person  owes  to  us.  As  Nietzsche  notes,  there  is  a  close 
etymological relation between “debt” and “guilt” [Schuld for both in German]. Guilt arises 
out of a sense of indebtedness to our ancestors (GM, II:19).  But this sort of indebtedness 49
was something we could pay oﬀ. Reverence to ancestors forms a key aspect of some religious 
traditions,  where  the  main  devotional  practice  is  in  the  form  of  gifts  oﬀered  to  the 
ancestors. These ancestors get transmogrified into gods (GM II:19). In the pagan world, the 
relationship with gods is still basically transactional, however. They give you things, you give 
them things.  They have given you a  good harvest.  Now you are  in  their  debt,  and you 
sacrifice  a  sheaf  of  wheat.  Christianity  is  a  change  in  several  respects.  There  is  one 
“maximum” God (GM II:2o) who is responsible for absolutely everything. But there is no 
way of possibly paying him back for all he has given you. And most importantly, it ceases to 
be plainly transactional. We are now seen as affront to God, for existing with the animal 
impulses we ineluctably have. We cannot fully expiate for these, nor can we rid ourselves of 
 Nietzsche is often taken (on the basis of passages such as GM, I:13 and others) to deny that we 48
have free will. (Leiter 2002; 2007). In the face of this apparent denial, much scholarly debate has 
centered around the figure of the ‘Sovereign Individual’ (GM, II:2) from the Second Essay and the 
possibility of a Nietzschean conception of autonomy, at least as the province of the few. If there is 
such a notion of autonomy, it will not be an innate metaphysical capacity that humans in general 
possess, but rather a rare achievement. (A number of papers on this topic are found in Gemes and 
May (2009). See also Anderson (2013). For continuing skepticism about this reading, see Leiter 
(2011). 
 For a discussion of the relation between guilt and bad conscience, see Risse (2001). 49
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them entirely. So, in a perverse twist, God makes a sacrifice of his own son (GM, II:21) to 
forgive us of our sins. This aﬀects to lift the weight of sin, but rather than lifting this burden 
for good, simply weighs us down with it all the more, since we are now indebted both to 
God and Christ for their loving self-sacrifice on our behalf. This engenders even more guilt, 
in a form that cannot be adequately expiated. 
The Third Essay explores the dominance of what Nietzsche calls “the ascetic ideal.” 
This ideal is already anticipated in the Second Essay, with the idea that we are an aﬀront to 
God, on account of our “base” animal drives (e.g., toward aggression or sex). The ascetic 
ideal  counsels  resisting,  deadening,  or  extirpating  these  drives,  insofar  as  possible.  As 
Nietzsche  indicates,  there  can  be  unproblematic  pragmatic  or  instrumental  forms  of 
asceticism  that  employ  forms  of  drive  suppression  (GM  III:9).  One  can  resist  the 50
temptation of passing impulses in order to undertake a particular project of some kind. The 
key feature of the ascetic ideal is that it will hold that asceticism is, in a way, an end-in-itself, 
an  optimal  human  condition  to  strive  for.  It  thereby  amounts  to  a  will  toward  self-
annihilation, of a form that in championed in diﬀerent ways by Buddhism, by Schopenhauer 
and by Christianity. Why has this ascetic ideal gotten a hold on us, Nietzsche wonders? His 
answer is striking: We need, he thinks, to find meaning in our suﬀering (GM, III:28). The 
apparatus of guilt, from the Second Essay, was one central way of doing that. It tells us: We 
suﬀer because we are bad people. But we also need to have a goal, something to will: Our 
“existence on earth contained no goal; ‘to what end man at all?’—was a question without 
answer; the will for man and earth was lacking” (GM, III:28). The ascetic ideal answers that 
need, giving us something to will, even if it is our own annihilation. In Nietzsche’s pithy 
 Gemes (2009b). 50
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phrase, we “would rather will  nothingness  than not will” (GM, III:1).  Although the ascetic 
ideal staves oﬀ “suicidal nihilism” (GM III:28), it poisons as much as it protects (GM, III:
15). 
Near the end of the Genealogy, Nietzsche gives us a key twist, returning to the “will to 
truth” theme we’ve already touched on. Whereas it might have seemed that the relentless 
will to truth, unmasking Christianity and its morality, is the ultimate expression of a secular 
ideal, Nietzsche wants to argue that appearances are deceiving. The “kernel” of the will to 
truth is the ascetic ideal. Those who relentlessly pursue truth are ultimately driven by a form 
of asceticism (GM, III:24-5). Far from being free from Christianity, they are simply its latest 
inheritors. They may have abandoned its metaphysics, but they have not shed its outlook 
entirely. And perhaps Nietzsche thinks something similar is true of himself as well.  51
It  may seem,  by the time we get  to  the end of  the Genealogy,  that  Nietzsche is 
unequivocally against Judeo-Christian morality and its various oﬀshoots. But this impression 
is rather misleading. He thinks it has been good in certain ways, while highly problematic in 
others.  But its moment has now passed. Many may have no live option but to remain in its 52
thrall. But for others, it shackles can be shed. By showing it to be a contingent creation, 
Nietzsche opens the way for eventually abandoning it. 
IX. The Antichrist: Anti-Christianity?
 Owen (2007). 51
 See Huddleston (2015). 52
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Nietzsche composed The Antichrist in 1888, an astonishingly productive year, in which 
he wrote 3 other books: Ecce Homo (discussed below), Twilight of the Idols, and The Case of 
Wagner. The latter two books I will leave oﬀ for reasons of space.53
Nietzsche conceived of The Antichrist as a first element in his envisaged project of a 
“revaluation of all values.” As we’ve seen in his discussion of the Genealogy, he wants us to 
reconsider the Christian values we might otherwise unthinkingly accept, even once we have 
given up on Christian theology and metaphysics. The book’s title makes reference to the 
“Antichrist,”  the false messiah in Christian theology,  with whom Christ will  allegedly do 
battle  on  his  second  coming.  With  this  allusive  title,  Nietzsche,  in  his  enmity  toward 
Christianity, is comparing himself to this Antichrist, but in a way suggesting that Christ 
himself  is  the  Antichrist,  a  false  messiah who has  been wrongly  revered for  nearly  two 
millennia. Nietzsche thus casts himself also as a kind of new Christ figure, saving us from 
the  Antichrist  Christ.  (This  will  come more  to  the  fore  in  the  title  of  his  Ecce  Homo). 
Although the title The Antichrist  can make it  seem as though the key opponent is  Jesus 
Christ, it contains an important ambiguity which does not come through fully in English 
translation. The German “Christ” means “Christ” (i.e., Jesus), but it is also the noun form of 
“Christian.” Punning on this ambiguity, Nietzsche notes that there was “only one [Christ/ 
Christian],  and  he  died  on  the  cross”  (A,  39).  As  we  will  see,  the  heart  of  Nietzsche’s 
opposition is really to the cult of Christianity that sprung up around Jesus Christ, less to the 
man himself. In the story that Nietzsche tells, the religion of Christianity is, in important 
ways, a betrayal of the message of Christ. The key villain in this narrative is St. Paul, by 
 While Twilight is rich in philosophical content, it is in some ways a summary restatement of key 53
Nietzschean themes that we’re considering elsewhere. The Case of Wagner, as the name would suggest, 
is a polemic against Richard Wagner. 
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Nietzsche’s reckoning a hate-filled “dysangelist” (A, 42) who invents the core of Christian 
dogma.  He  organizes  Christianity  around  hope  for  an  afterlife.  But  this,  according  to 
Nietzsche, is alien to Christ’s key message, which is about a way of living this life. 
Although  Christ’s  emphasis  on  compassion  for  the  sick  and  suﬀering  is  anti-
Nietzschean, there is one key respect in which Christ is oﬀering a Nietzschean ideal. He is 
notably free from ressentiment (A, 40).  Although vile things are done to him, a desire for 
vengeance is not present in his psychology. He is the champion of turning the other cheek, 
seeking to love where others hate. Nietzsche thinks that he, unlike his followers, actually 
achieved this. Although Christ is clearly very weird, Nietzsche finds something fascinating 
and admirable in his example. Christians, by contrast, claim to turn the other cheek against 
those who oppress or wrong them, but this is often a mask for something else: a desire for 
vengeance against such people and for power over them. These motives find expression in 
subterranean ways (Cp., GM I:13-15). Mendacity [Verlogenheit] is also a dominant thread in 
the discussion (e.g, A, 9). Christians are not capable of full self-understanding, because this 
will unmask the poisonous forces that drive them. In addition to this moral-psychological 
failing, Nietzsche also objects to the basic evaluative stance of Christianity. It has turned 
upside down the values of  the classical  world,  thereby making “an unvalue out of  every 
value”  (A,  62).  Strength,  nobility,  bodily  pleasure  get  branded  as  evils,  and  weakness, 
humility,  and  asceticism get  celebrated.  Nietzsche  sums  this  up  with  the  formula  that 
Christianity is anti-life, or is “life-negating.” Is the idea here simply that a mistake is being 
made in Christianity?  Nietzsche is  concerned with matters  of  truth and falsity,  and the 
falseness of Christianity is one thread in his discussion. But he claims that the fundamental 
problem with  Christianity  is  about  the  values  it  endorses.  Thus,  Nietzsche’s  account  is 
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deeply  ethical  in  spirit.  It  is  not,  fundamentally,  about  whether  or  not  God  exists,  or 
whether Christian theology is correct. It is instead about whether God, and the values he 
represents, are worthy of reverence (A, 47). 
X. Ecce Homo 
As mentioned in the previous section, Nietzsche, in the title of The Antichrist,  is 
implicitly  comparing  himself  to  Christ.  That  becomes  even  more  explicit  in  his 
autobiography Ecce Homo, which he started writing at the age of 44, in October 1888. Its title 
echoes the words of Pontius Pilate, presenting the scourged Christ: Behold the man. But 
Nietzsche wants us to take that phrase literally, to behold him for what he is. “Hear me! For 
I am such and such a person. Above all, do not mistake me for what I am not” (EH, Preface, 
1). Hence the writing of the autobiography.
In Ecce Homo, Nietzsche goes in for considerable self-aggrandizement. Its first few 
sections include chapter titles such as “Why I am So Wise,” “Why I am So Clever,” “Why I 
Write Such Good Books,” “Why I am Destiny.” To some degree, this is tongue-in-cheek, 
mocking  the  self-congratulatory  genre  of  autobiography.  But  it  is  also  indicative  of 
Nietzsche’s sense of his world-historical importance, perhaps with more than a dash of his 
incipient madness. The book is subtitled “How One Becomes What One Is,” and Nietzsche 
explores  that  theme  throughout  the  text,  considering  the  diﬀerent  ways  in  which  the 
circumstances of his life led to his development and his success. Here the key idea is about 
conditions of individual  enhancement. What is good for Nietzsche may not be good for 
others.  He focuses in particular  on the everyday:  diet,  climate,  exercise—things that he 
thinks philosophers have thus far neglected in their concern for the elevation of the spirit 
Page    of  38 47
over the body. Nietzsche thinks that these mundane conditions are at least as important and 
worthy of consideration insofar as human flourishing is concerned than the sorts of things 
that occupy attention in the Judeo-Christian tradition (e.g., sexual chastity, the purity of 
one’s soul, and the like). He writes: “I am much more interested in a question on which the 
"salvation of humanity" depends far more than on any theologians' curio: the question of 
nutrition. For ordinary use, one may formulate it thus: ‘how do you, among all people, have to 
eat to attain your maximum of strength, of virtù in the Renaissance style of moraline-free 
virtue?’” (EH, “Clever” 1). 
In presenting this narrative of his own life, Ecce Homo also exemplifies an important 
Nietzschean theme, namely that of self-creation. In The Gay Science, Nietzsche describes the 
process of “‘giv[ing] style’” to one’s character: “a great and rare art. It is practiced by those 
who survey all  the  strengths  and weaknesses  of  their  nature  and then fit  them into an 
artistic plan until every one of them appears as art and reason and even weaknesses delight 
the eye” (GS, 290). In Ecce Homo, we see Nietzsche describing how he has done this, but also 
to some extent doing this, precisely by retelling his own philosophical career, in such a way as 
to give it an attractive narrative arc.54
XI. Nietzsche’s Legacy
Along with Hegel and Marx, Nietzsche is among the most influential philosophers of 
the 19th century.  In the time since his death, at which point his works were gaining in 
popularity, he came to be embraced by a variety of figures on the left and on the right.  His 55
 See Nehamas (1985) for an exploration of this theme. 54
 Aschheim (1994)55
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appropriation by the Nazis in Germany, well after his death, left a damaging stain on his 
reputation. But he was rehabilitated in the anglophone philosophical world, partly through 
the  eﬀorts  of  his  distinguished  German-American  translator  Walter  Kaufmann,  who 
published a landmark study of Nietzsche shortly after the Second World War.  In the past 56
decades, Nietzsche scholarship has grown into an increasingly sophisticated philosophical 
sub-discipline,  carrying  forward  the  sort  of  rigorous  philosophical-reconstructive  work 
practiced on Kant and Hegel, and the philosophical figures preceding them. 
His  influence  on  20th  century  thought  was  profound.  Freud  oﬀers  a  drive-
psychological picture of human beings, and theory of unconscious motivation, that is very 
much in the vein of Nietzsche. Heidegger, drawing heavily on Nietzsche’s notebooks, gives 
an extensive series of lectures on Nietzsche in the 1930s, which will place Nietzsche as the 
last figure in what Heidegger saw as the history of metaphysics. Foucault will take up the 
practice of genealogy, extending its methods beyond the phenomena that Nietzsche himself 
considered,  in  order  to  explore  diﬀerent  ones,  and  citing  considerably  more  concrete 
evidence in the process. He will write about the treatment of the mentally ill (and the very 
idea  of  “madness”  as  a  kind  of  illness),  methods  of  punishment,  medical  perception, 
sexuality, and other topics. Power, a Nietzschean notion recast in a Foucaultian inflection, 
will figure centrally in all these accounts. 
After decades of near-total neglect, Nietzsche also is now having increasing influence 
in  anglophone  philosophy  as  well.  Bernard  Williams,  one  of  the  most  important  moral 
philosophers of the 20th century, and a philosopher in many respects firmly in the analytic 
tradition,  took  a  keen  interest  in  Nietzsche,  and  a  number  of  other  prominent  moral 
 Kaufmann (1974 [1950]). 56
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philosophers have taken his views into account, including Philippa Foot, Derek Parfit, Susan 
Wolf, R. Jay Wallace, and others. In his monumental tome, On What Matters, Parfit, though 
no friend of Nietzsche’s views, admits that he is the “most influential and admired moral 
philosopher  of  the  last  two  centuries,”  and  devotes  several  chapters  to  engaging  with 
Nietzsche’s views.  57
Nietzsche’s influence reaches not just to philosophy, but into the arts and culture 
more broadly. Yeats, Mahler, Mann, Musil,  Rilke, Hesse, Kubrick, and many others were 
deeply inspired by Nietzsche.  Given Nietzsche’s  thoroughgoing concern with matters of 
culture, this wide reach is at least as important to him as aﬀecting change in philosophical 
debate alone. 
Though  he  is,  in  one  sense,  unquestionably  a  canonical  philosophical  figure, 
Nietzsche  is  also,  in  another  sense,  a  kind  of  philosophical  outsider.  There  are  various 
reasons  for  this.  But  the  most  profound reason,  I  suspect,  is  that  Nietzsche  was  not 58
especially interested in the bread and butter of philosophy, as practiced in the anglophone 
world, and by many of his historical predecessors: making fine-grained distinctions, making 
careful arguments with premises leading ineluctably to a conclusion. He wants instead to 
diagnose a crisis in Western culture, and to point the way beyond it. Like those he labels 
“genuine philosophers” in Beyond Good and Evil, he hopes to give us a new “for Whither and 
What” for humankind. Brilliant diagnostician though he was, Nietzsche, it is fair to say, did 
not succeed at this hugely ambitious task, if success would mean that his preferred vision 
took  hold  and  gained  suﬃcient  ascendancy.  But  more  than  perhaps  any  philosopher  in 
 Parfit (2011), p. 57057
 See the discussion in Loeb (2017). 58
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history, he confronts us with searching, unsettling reflections on the values we hold, and 
oﬀers an exalted—if  ultimately unrealizable and indeed somewhat unpalatable—vision of 
what might replace them. 59
 I am grateful to Ken Gemes and John Shand for their comments on drafts of this piece. 59
Page    of  42 47
References: 
Works by Nietzsche
Works by Nietzsche are cited by section number using the following abbreviations and 
translations, which I have modified where I’ve thought appropriate.
A = The Antichrist, trans. Walter Kaufmann
BGE = Beyond Good and Evil, trans. Walter Kaufmann
BT = The Birth of Tragedy, trans. Ronald Speirs
D = Daybreak, trans. R.J. Hollingdale
EH = Ecce Homo, trans. Walter Kaufmann
ENB= Writings from the Early Notebooks, trans. Löb, ed. Geuss and Nehamas
GM = On the Genealogy of Morals, trans. Walter Kaufmann/ On the Genealogy of Morality, 
trans. Clark and Swenson. 
GS = The Gay Science, trans. Walter Kaufmann
HH = Human, All Too Human, trans. R.J. Hollingdale
TSZ = Thus Spoke Zarathustra, trans. Walter Kaufmann
WP = The Will to Power, trans. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale
In works that comprise several individual essays, after the abbreviation is the essay number 
(as a Roman numeral) and section number (as an arabic numeral). For example, GM, I:2 is 
On the Genealogy of Morals, Essay I, Section 2. In works that include titled main sections, I 
include a key word for that section, followed by subsection numbers, if applicable. For 
example, TI, “Socrates,” 1 is the Twilight of the Idols section “The Problem of Socrates,” sub-
section 1.
For the German I rely on the following, cited by volume and page number.
KSA= Kritische Studienausgabe, ed. Colli and Montinari (de Gruyter). 
Secondary Literature
Acampora, Christa (ed.) (2006), Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morals: Critical Essays, 
Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
Anderson, R. Lanier (1998), “Truth and Objectivity in Perspectivism,” Synthese 115:1, p. 1–32.
–––(2005), “Nietzsche on Truth, Illusion, and Redemption,” European Journal of Philosophy 
13:2 185–225.
–––(2009), “Nietzsche on Redemption and Transfiguration”, in The Re-enchantment of the 
World: Secular Magic in a Rational Age, Joshua Landy and Michael Saler (eds.), Palo Alto: 
Stanford University Press, p. 225–58.
–––(2012), “What is a Nietzschean Self?” in Janaway and Robertson (eds.), p. 202–35.
–––(2011), “On the Nobility of Nietzsche’s Priests,” in May (ed.) (2011). 
Page    of  43 47
–––(2013), “Nietzsche on Autonomy,” in Gemes and Richardson (eds.), p. 432–60.
Ansell-Pearson, Keith (2005), A Companion to Nietzsche, London: Wiley-Blackwell. 
Aschheim, Stephen (1994), The Nietzsche Legacy in Germany: 1890-1990, Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press. 
Berry, Jessica (2011), Nietzsche and the Ancient Skeptical Tradition, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.
Blue, Daniel (2016), The Making of Friedrich Nietzsche: The Quest for Identity 1844-1869, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Bittner, Rüdger (1994), “Ressentiment”, in Schacht (ed.), p. 127–38.
Came, Daniel (2005), “The Aesthetic Justification of Existence,” in Ansell-Pearson (ed.).
–––(2014) (ed.), Nietzsche on Art and Life, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Cate, Curtis (2002), Friedrich Nietzsche, London: Hutchinson.
Chamberlain, Lesley (1996), Nietzsche in Turin: An Intimate Biography, New York: St. Martin’s 
Press. 
Clark, Maudemarie (1990), Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
––– (1998), “On Knowledge, Truth, and Value: Nietzsche’s Debt to Schopenhauer and the 
Development of his Empiricism”, in Janaway (ed.), p. 37–78.
––– (2000), “Nietzsche’s Doctrine of the Will to Power: Neither Ontological nor Biological”, 
International Studies in Philosophy, 32:3, p. 119–35.
––– (2015), Nietzsche on Ethics and Politics, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Clark, Maudemarie and David Dudrick, (2012), The Soul of Nietzsche’s Beyond Good and Evil, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
D’Iorio, Paolo (2016), Nietzsche’s Journey to Sorrento, trans. Sylvia Mae Gorelick. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press.
Foucault, Michel (1977), “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” in Language, Counter-memory, 
Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews, Donald Bouchard and Sherry Simon (trans.), Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press.
Page    of  44 47
Gemes, Ken (1992), “Nietzsche’s Critique of Truth,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 
52:1, p. 47–65.
––– (2001), “Postmodernism’s Use and Abuse of Nietzsche,” Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research 62:2, p. 337–60.
––– (2006), “‘We Remain of Necessity Strangers to Ourselves:’ The Key Message of 
Nietzsche’s Genealogy,” in Acampora (ed.). 
––– (2009a), “Nietzsche on Free Will, Autonomy, and the Sovereign Individual,” in Gemes 
and May (eds.), p. 33–49.
––– (2009b), “Freud and Nietzsche on Sublimation”, Journal of Nietzsche Studies 38, p. 38–59.
––– (2013), “Life’s Perspectives”, in Gemes and Richardson (eds.), p. 553–75.
Gemes, Ken and Simon May (eds.) (2009), Nietzsche on Freedom and Autonomy, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.
Gemes, Ken and John Richardson (eds.) (2013), The Oxford Handbook of Nietzsche, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.
Gemes, Ken and Chris Sykes (2014), “Nietzsche’s Illusion,” in Came (ed.). 
Geuss, Raymond (1994), “Nietzsche and Genealogy,” European Journal of Philosophy 2:3, p. 
274–292.
–––(1999), “Art and Theodicy,” in his Morality, Culture, and History, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.  
Hayman, Ronald (1980), Nietzsche: A Critical Life, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Heidegger, Martin, 1981 [1961], Nietzsche, 4 Vols., David Farrell Krell (trans.), London: 
Routledge.
Huddleston, Andrew (2014), “Nietzsche’s Meta-Axiology: Against the Sceptical Readings,” 
British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 22:2, p.322-43.
–––(2015), “What is Enshrined in Morality: Understanding the Grounds for Nietzsche’s 
Critique,” Inquiry 58:3, p. 281-307.
–––(2017), “Nietzsche on the Health of the Soul,” Inquiry 60:1-2, p. 135-164.
––– (forthcoming a), “Aﬃrmation, Admirable Overvaluation, and the Eternal Recurrence”, in 
Daniel Came (ed.), Nietzsche on Morality and Aﬃrmation, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Page    of  45 47
––– (forthcoming b) “Against ‘Egypticism’: Nietzsche on Understanding and Defining 
Concepts,” in Routledge Philosophy Minds: Nietzsche, Paul Katsafanas (ed.), London: Routledge 
Press.  
Huenemann, Charlie (2013), “Nietzsche’s Illness,” in Gemes and Richardson (eds.)
Hussain, Nadeem J.Z (2004), “Nietzsche’s Positivism,” European Journal of Philosophy, 12:3, p. 
326–68.
Janaway, Christopher (1998), Willing and Nothingness: Schopenhauer as Nietzsche’s Educator. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
–––(2007), Beyond Selflessness: Reading Nietzsche’s Genealogy, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
–––(2014), “Beauty is False, Truth Ugly: Nietzsche on Art and Life,” in Came (ed.)
Janaway, Christopher and Simon Robertson (eds.) (2012), Nietzsche, Naturalism, and 
Normativity, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Katsafanas, Paul (2013), “Nietzsche’s Philosophical Psychology”, in Richardson and Gemes 
2013: 727–55.
Kaufmann, Walter (1974), Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist, 4th edition, Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press.
Leiter, Brian (1998), “The Paradox of Fatalism and Self-Creation in Nietzsche”, in Janaway 
(ed.) (1998), p. 217–57.
––– (2002), Nietzsche on Morality, London: Routledge.
–––(2007), “Nietzsche’s Theory of the Will,” Philosopher’s Imprint 7:7.
–––(2011), “Who is Nietzsche’s ‘Sovereign Individual’?” in May (ed.).
Leiter, Brian and Neil Sinhababu (eds.) (2007), Nietzsche and Morality, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.
Loeb, Paul (2006), “Identity and Eternal Recurrence”, in Ansell-Pearson (ed.)
––– (2010), The Death of Nietzsche’s Zarathustra, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
––– (2013), “Eternal Recurrence,” in Gemes and Richardson (eds.) (2013), p. 645–71.
––– (2017), “Nietzsche’s Place in the Aristotelian History of Philosophy,” Nietzsche and the 
Philosophers, (ed.) Mark Conard, London: Routledge Press. 
Page    of  46 47
Magnus, Bernd (1988), “The Use and Abuse of The Will to Power,” in Solomon and Higgins 
(ed.). 
May, Simon (1999), Nietzsche’s Ethics and his War on Morality, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
––– (ed.) (2011), Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morality: A Critical Guide, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Migotti, Mark (1998) “Slave Morality, Socrates, and the Bushmen: a Reading of the First 
Essay of the Genealogy of Morals,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 58:4, p. 745–79.
Nehamas, Alexander (1985) Nietzsche: Life as Literature, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press.
––– (1988), “Who are ‘The Philosophers of the Future’?: A Reading of Beyond Good and Evil”, 
in Solomon and Higgins (eds.), p. 46–67.
–––(2000), “For Whom the Sun Shines: A Reading of Also Sprach Zarathustra,” in Also Sprach 
Zarathustra, (ed.) Volker Gerhardt, Berlin: Akademie Verlag, p. 165-90.
––– (2015), “Did Nietzsche Hold a ‘Falsification Thesis’?” Philosophical Inquiry, 39:1, p. 222–36.
Owen, David (2007), Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morality, Montreal: McGill University Press.
Parfit, Derek (2011), On What Matters, Volume II, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Patton, Lydia (2015), “The Methodology of the Sciences,” in the Oxford Handbook of German 
Philosophy in the 19th Century, ed. Michael Forster and Kristin Gjesdal. 
Pippin, Robert B. (1988), “Irony and Aﬃrmation in Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke Zarathustra,” in 
Michael Allen Gillespie & Tracy B. Strong (eds.), Nietzsche's New Seas: Explorations in 
Philosophy, Aesthetics, and Politics, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, p. 45–71
–––(2010), Nietzsche, Psychology, and First Philosophy, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Reginster, Bernard (1997), “Nietzsche on Ressentiment and Valuation,” Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research, 57:2, p. 281–305.
–––(2003), “What is a Free Spirit? Nietzsche on Fanaticism,”Archiv für Geschichte der 
Philosophie, 85:1, p. 51–85.
–––(2006), The Aﬃrmation of Life: Nietzsche on Overcoming Nihilism, Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press.
Richardson, John (1996), Nietzsche’s System, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Page    of  47 47
Ridley, Aaron (2007), Nietzsche on Art, London: Routledge.
––– (2009) “Nietzsche’s Intentions: What the Sovereign Individual Promises”, in Gemes and 
May (eds.) (2009), p. 181–96.
Risse, Matthias (2001) “The Second Treatise in the Genealogy of Morality: Nietzsche on the 
Origin of the Bad Conscience,” European Journal of Philosophy, 9:1, p. 55–81.
Safranski, Rüdiger (2003) Nietzsche: a Philosophical Biography, Shelley Frisch (trans.), New 
York: Norton.
Schacht, Richard (1983), Nietzsche, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
Schacht, Richard, (ed.) (1994), Nietzsche, Genealogy, Morality: Essays on Nietzsche’s Genealogy of 
Morals, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
Schuringa, Christoph (2014), Nietzsche’s Genealogical Histories and His Project of 
Revaluation,” History of Philosophy Quarterly 31:3, p. 249-269.
Soll, Ivan (1980), “Reflections on Recurrence: a Re-Examination of Nietzsche’s Doctrine, die 
Ewige Wiederkehr des Gleichens,” in Solomon, p. 322–42.
Solomon, Robert and Kathleen Higgins (eds.) (1988), Reading Nietzsche, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.
Solomon, Robert (1980), Nietzsche: A Collection of Critical Essays, South Bend: Notre Dame 
University Press. 
Tanner, Michael (1994), Nietzsche, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Tevenar, Gudrun von (2013), “Thus Spoke Zarathustra” in Gemes and Richardson (ed.). 
Wallace, R. Jay (2007), “Ressentiment, Value, and Self-Vindication: Making Sense of 
Nietzsche’s Slave Revolt”, in Leiter and Sinhababu (eds.) (2007), p. 110–37.
Young, Julian (1992), Nietzsche’s Philosophy of Art, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
–––(2006), Nietzsche’s Philosophy of Religion, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
–––(2010), Friedrich Nietzsche: a Philosophical Biography, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.
